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Corporate Social Responsibility: Exploring 
Stakeholder Relationships and Programme 
Reporting across Leading FTSE Companies 
 
Abstract 
Although it is now widely recognised by business leaders that their companies   
need to accept a broader responsibility than short-term profits, recent research 
suggests that as corporate social responsibility (CSR) and social reporting 
become more widespread, there is little empirical evidence of the range of 
stakeholders addressed through their CSR programmes and how such 
programmes are reported.  
 
Through a CSR framework which was developed in an exploratory study, we 
explore the nature of stakeholder relationships reported across leading FTSE 
companies and the importance they attach to communicating both social and 
business outcomes. 
 
It is evident from the hypotheses tested that the bigger FTSE companies, 
particularly extraction companies and telecoms, are more adept at identifying and 
prioritising their stakeholders, and linking CSR programmes to business and 
social outcomes. However, we draw the general conclusion that building stronger 
stakeholder relationships through CSR programmes – other than with customers 
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- is not currently a priority for most companies. We also conclude that a limited 
sophistication in managing multiple stakeholders may compromise the impact of 
CSR upon business and social results. Finally, the managerial implications and 
the contribution of our study are discussed before closing with an 
acknowledgement of the limitations of this work and suggestions for further 
research. 
Keywords 
Corporate Social Responsibility; 
Leading FTSE Companies;  
Stakeholder Relationships;  
Social and Business Outcomes.  
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Corporate Social Responsibility: Exploring Stakeholder 
Relationships and Programme Reporting across 
Leading FTSE Companies 
 
 
Introduction 
At a recent conference in London the CEO of Sustainability, a widely-respected 
authority on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), offered a stark critique of 
management practices.  On the one hand, his research suggests that the number 
of firms engaged in social reporting is increasing, as is the average length of their 
reports.  However, despite a widening recognition among business leaders of the 
need to accept a broader responsibility than short-term profits, he concludes that 
the quality of their CSR reporting has hardly improved in the last 5 years 
(Elkington, 2003).  At the same conference, Simon Zadek of Accountability 
argues that neither these CSR programmes nor their reporting procedures have 
a significant impact on business decision making (Zadek, 2002). 
 We report on a quantitative study of CSR reporting among a number of leading 
FTSE companies (the top 150 FTSE4GooDi companies) to explore the nature 
and scope of their CSR stakeholder relationships and reporting.  The study tests 
six hypotheses based upon a framework for understanding CSR practices which 
we developed through an exploratory study (Maklan and Knox, 2003). We 
conclude that only the biggest of these FTSE companies, particularly extraction 
companies and telecoms, can claim to identify, prioritise and communicate with 
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their CSR stakeholders.  However, the majority are now reporting details of the 
social outcomes linked to their CSR programmes but the reporting of business 
outcomes is limited to the largest of FTSE companies.  
We then discuss the management issues which need to be resolved if the 
general perception of CSR is to change from being regarded mainly as an 
expensive exercise in compliance and reporting to an important contributor of 
sustainable business development.  Finally, we highlight the limitations of our 
study and make suggestions for future research.   
In the next section, we explore the growing impact of CSR on business as 
viewed by differing interest groups. 
 
The Growing Impact of Corporate Responsibility on Businesses 
Over thirty years ago, Milton Friedman wrote in the New York Times that the 
social responsibility of a business was to increase its profits.  Any diversion of 
company resources to social programmes, charity and other non-profit 
generating activities, the Nobel Laureate argues, represents a tax on consumers 
and investors (Friedman, 1970).  Such a tax reduces society’s total wealth and 
satisfaction.  His position, based upon sound free-market ideology, has come 
under increasing attack since time of writing and can no longer provide the 
business leader with an erudite means of avoiding the issue.  Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) is something that every Board must now address in some 
form.  Ironically, it is arguably the triumph of free-market ideology over regulated 
 5
economies which has foisted new responsibilities on increasingly powerful 
multinationals companies.  Globalisation strategies provide businesses with 
unprecedented access to markets and ever-lower production costs (Day and 
Montgomery, 1999), it has also brought closer to reality the concept of the global 
village first discussed in the 1980s by Levitt (1983).  Business practices, even 
those conducted a very long way from their home markets, can be subject to 
intense scrutiny and comment by customers, employees, suppliers, shareholders 
and governments, as well as other groups upon whose support the business 
relies (Googins and Rochin, 2000). One such group, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), have become more and more powerful in recent years, 
calling business to account for policies in the areas of fair trade, human rights, 
workers’ rights, environmental impact, financial probity and corporate 
governance.  In an ever more cynical world, where society is much less inclined 
to trust their governments and businesses, NGOs retain high levels of trust 
across a broad spectrum of society. 
 
Whilst it is true that in certain circumstances powerful multinational companies 
can impose trading conditions on the less powerful, such as non-unionised 
workers, commodity producers in developing countries and third world labourers 
(Klein, 1999), the idea that modern companies must commit themselves to 
effectively address poverty and environmental degradation must surely be an 
overstatement.  This discussion between advocates of Milton Friedman’s position 
– limiting responsibility to maximising profit – and NGO activists who regard firms 
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being primarily instruments of social policy represents the extreme ends of the 
debate. Many academics writing in the field of CSR are cognisant of these 
extremes and seek to establish a middle ground: 
 
Wood (1991) suggests that the public responsibility of business is divided into 
areas of social involvement directly related to their business activities and 
competencies, with secondary areas of involvement relating to its primary 
activities.  For example, an auto maker might reasonably be expected to deal 
with vehicle safety and the environment but not low-income housing or adult 
illiteracy.  Clarkson’s long-term study of corporate behaviour (Clarkson, 1995) 
indicates that companies deal with stakeholders, not society, and that CSR must 
distinguish between stakeholder needs and social issues; managers can address 
stakeholder requirements but not abstract social policy.  Carroll (1979, 1991) 
suggests corporate responsibility has different layers:  economic, legal, ethical 
and discretionary categories of business performance and those business 
leaders must decide the layer at which they choose to operate. 
 
Similarly, the UK Government wishes to establish a middle ground in this debate, 
with the Prime Minister suggesting that, “we must ensure that economic growth 
contributes to our quality of life, rather than degrading it.  And we can all share 
the benefits”. (DTI, 2001). 
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Finally, although business leaders themselves acknowledge that their firms are 
socially created and ‘licensed’, most would argue they were created primarily as 
economic agents to provide the goods and services society wants at the right 
price, quality and availability.  As such, their firms’ competencies are built around 
their commercial activities and they have very limited expertise addressing 
complex social and economic problems.  As an example to illustrate this point, 
we argue that while one thousand software firms tackling global poverty through 
a myriad of small initiatives is laudable, it is likely to be ineffective.  Arguably, it 
would be more effective – and efficient – for governments to tax these firms and 
give the money to multinational agencies that are competent in the field. 
In establishing the scope of our research, we sought to identify received wisdom 
about CSR activities in general, and the impact of these activities across 
stakeholders regarding business and social outcomes in particular.  In both 
cases, we find the arguments presented and claims made about the positive 
impact of CSR on the business and key stakeholders to be highly assumptive 
and lacking in empiricism.  These assumptions are presented next and our 
questioning of these beliefs forms the background to our research objectives. 
 
Assertions and Beliefs about the Impact of CSR Programmes 
In reviewing the arguments that ‘you do well by doing good’, we can readily 
identify five commonly-held beliefs which seem to be largely anecdotal and, as 
such, highly questionable: 
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• Consumer preferences will increasingly favour products and services from 
socially responsible, transparent and trustworthy firms (Wilmott, 2001 and 
Mitchell, 2001). 
− The assertion that consumer behaviour will shift to reward social 
responsibility is grounded in surveys of attitudes and trade-off analysis, 
not observed behaviour.  Attitude-behaviour correspondence seems to 
lack empirical grounding and is not obviously evident when researched 
(Knox and Walker, 2001, 2003). 
• Investors will increasingly favour responsible companies and irresponsible 
companies will find their cost of borrowing rises (Accountability, 2002). 
− Zadek (2002) acknowledges that only 4% of the total funds available for 
stock market investment are governed by CSR principles, therefore, most 
firms judged not to be socially responsible still have full access to equity 
funding. However, more recent data suggests that the much-anticipated 
investor demands for responsibility are increasing in “CSR-aware” 
environments such as Western Europe and Canada (Bartolomeo and 
Famillari, 2004; SIO, 2005).  In Europe SRI funds grew in excess of 50% 
in 2004. 
• Potential employees will be attracted only to responsible companies and 
others risk skill shortages (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001: Citing the 
1998 McKinsey Study, “The War for Talent” and MORI research). 
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− Arguments about competing for talent also appear to be based upon 
stated intention and not observed behaviour.  Cited studies were 
concluded during the last long period of uninterrupted economic growth 
and may be cyclical.  This link between employee motivations, customer 
retention and shareholder value has been made separately from CSR 
theory (Reichheld, 1996). 
• Engaging with stakeholders encourages innovation.  DTI case studies (2001, 
2002) and Kong et al (2002) cite examples of cost savings and revenue 
growth through fairer supplier policies. 
− Von Hippel (1986, 1989, Thomke and Von Hippel, 2002) has been 
presenting these arguments and case- studies for over 20 years without 
reference to CSR practices. 
• Being trusted by stakeholders and pursuing socially responsible policies 
reduces risks arising from safety issues (consumer, employee and 
community), potential boycotts and loss of corporate reputation. 
− Clearly, concern for safety and building trust is paramount to the firm’s 
reputation management and future sales but cannot be exclusively 
associated with CSR policies.  In fact, it’s just good business practice to 
pursue both with vigour. 
 
In essence, while the above arguments for CSR are intuitively appealing, many 
researchers admit the links between developing a sustainable business strategy 
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and the implementation of CSR programmes are difficult, if not impossible, to 
prove (Wood and Jones, 1995).  It is against this background we have set our 
research objectives, hypotheses and protocol that we discussed next. 
 
Research Objectives, Hypotheses and Protocol 
Our research aim is to contribute to the development of descriptive CSR theory 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995) by providing a greater understanding of how 
leading FTSE companies, who have been identified as having well-developed 
CSR reporting practicesi, choose to engage with stakeholders: the nature of their 
CSR programmes and what they communicate to them through their CSR 
reports.  So far as we are aware, there is little prior theory or an appropriate 
framework in the literature for us to draw upon in developing our research 
objectives and hypotheses.  Consequently, to provide this framework for the 
quantitative study reported here, we first carried out an exploratory study across 
six multinational companies.  Through semi-structured interviews with the CSR 
leaders of these six firms, a framework has been generated from a prototype 
based on the literature (Maklan and Knox, 2003).  This exploratory study was 
grounded in the literature that links CSR investment to business outcomes and 
draws variously upon Financial Theory, Corporate Reputation, Brand Marketing, 
Customer Relationship Management and Strategy. In the study, we asked 
respondents to verify the extent to which their companies are able to validate the 
causal pathways implied from these literatures. For example, the extent to which 
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their CSR programmes reduces borrowing costs, improves employee recruitment 
or customer loyalty. Respondents were also asked to draw their perceptions of 
the casual map linking their CSR programmes with business and social 
outcomes. The data from these interviews was synthesised to produce Figure 1:  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
   
Figure 1 illustrates the key findings from our exploratory research. Each company 
in our study had intuitive reasons for developing CSR programmes based upon 
its vision and values. Respondents presented arguments for investing in CSR 
based on factors such as fit with their brand values, relevance to customers and 
attractiveness to their employees. They all believed that CSR investments would 
enhance their corporate or brand reputation and motivate employees; the latter 
was of particular interest to service-based companies. As CSR values and 
polices became embedded in the organisation, respondents anticipated that 
employee behaviours and decision-making would change in consideration of the 
needs of key stakeholders.  By listening and responding to a broader influencing 
audience and by fostering the firm’s reputation, there was a belief that the 
attitudes and subsequent behaviours of such stakeholders towards the firm and 
its commercial offers could be influenced.  Ultimately, respondents believed that 
this would lead to increased turnover, reduced cost and more sustainable 
performance (less volatility of cash flow).  
 12
 Most of the companies interviewed had ongoing measurement systems of 
employee attitudes and corporate reputation but could not isolate the impact of 
CSR programmes from all other influences or provide empirical data to link them 
with stakeholder behaviour and business outcomes. In other words, figure 1 
represents a managerial construction of the intuitive logic behind developing 
CSR practices and it is this framework that is used to develop and test the six 
hypotheses stemming from our research objectives:   
• To explore the nature and scope of stakeholder relationships among 
leading FTSE companies based upon their CSR reporting. 
• To identify the extent their CSR programmes and reporting impact on 
social and business outcomes. 
• To compare and contrast these findings according to market capitalisation 
and industry sector. 
 
Developing the Research Hypotheses  
 
The three main aspects of the CSR Framework (figure 1) we are exploring in this 
study are stakeholder relationships, social outcomes and business outcomes.  
Against each, we also highlight the research hypotheses being tested and 
provide an explanation of their derivation from the CSR literature:  
CSR Stakeholder Relationships 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Companies clearly identify key stakeholders 
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Stakeholders are defined as: “anyone who is directly or indirectly involved with 
the corporation: employees, citizens, shareholders, NGOs, unions and 
government agencies, in short: the social and physical environment” (Clarkson, 
1995).  Clarkson also notes that a multi-stakeholder dialogue is not a 
straightforward and simple activity. Since the early 1980s, the concepts of 
stakeholder and multi-stakeholder dialogue play a central role in discussions on 
CSR. Clarkson (1995), over viewing his data from more than fifty case studies, 
concludes that corporate social responsibilities, responsiveness, and 
performances are best understood by analysing and evaluating the way in which 
corporations actually manage their relationships with employees, customers, 
shareholders, suppliers, governments, and the communities in which they 
operate. The first proposition is designed to test whether companies perform as 
Clarkson recommends by identifying their key stakeholders identified in figure 1.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Companies do not systematically prioritise stakeholders 
This hypothesis was drawn from our 2003 empirical study of CSR practices 
which found that companies are clear about their most important stakeholder but 
do not seem to set priorities among secondary stakeholders.  
Thus, this hypothesis is designed to test whether leading FTSE companies 
establish priorities between their stakeholders. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): CSR investment are communicated effectively to stake- 
holders 
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Figure 1 suggests that companies can communicate their CSR policies to 
stakeholders in a manner that affects stakeholders’ attitudes and subsequently 
their behaviours.  Maignon and Ferrell (2003) challenge this assertion and call for 
research which scrutinizes the communication strategies, media, and appeals 
most appropriate to engender awareness of CSR practices and to stimulate 
stakeholder identification.  This hypothesis will determine whether or not 
companies are able to effectively communicate their CSR investment through 
their annual reports. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Companies are not currently developing relationships with a 
large range of stakeholders 
Hypothesis 4 is the final aspect of stakeholder relationships to be tested here and 
is derived from our original study (Maklan and Knox, 2003) and Windsor’s work 
(2001) which explores whether or not companies are starting to develop 
relationships across a broad range of their stakeholders. Windsor examines 
Bowen’s (1953) key question of whether the interests of business and society 
merge in the long run and provides a developmental history of corporate social 
responsibility from the progressive era forward to Carroll’s (1991) pyramid of 
corporate social responsibilities.  The paper also offers caveats concerning the 
future directions and prospects for corporate social responsibility theory and 
practice. Windsor highlights the need for managers to understand that there are 
serious deviations between short run impacts of business activities and the long 
run alignment of business and social interests in wealth creation. To counter this, 
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he suggests that companies should focus more on building broader relationships 
with their stakeholders. 
 
CSR Social and Business Outcomes 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Social outcomes linked to CSR investment are difficult to 
identify 
Only one of the six companies participating in the authors’ qualitative study 
(2003) systematically assesses the social benefit of its CSR investment. 
Schwartz and Carroll (2003), extrapolating from Carroll’s work (1979, 1991), 
stress that it is difficult for companies to ascertain identifiable social outcomes 
from their CSR investment. Yet if companies do not measure social benefit, how 
are they to assess the effectiveness of their CSR programmes? 
This hypothesis aims to discover whether companies are able to identify any 
social outcomes and other wider benefits from their CSR programme. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): CSR is not currently linked with specific business outcomes 
Companies find it difficult to isolate the impact of CSR investments from all other 
business activities when assessing stakeholder behaviour and business 
outcomes (Maklan and Knox, 2003).  We report that companies monitor 
stakeholder attitudes regularly and systematically but find it much harder to move 
to the ‘right hand side’ of figure 1 and link changes in stakeholders’ attitudes to 
behaviours, and, subsequently, to business outcomes.  It is intuitively appealing 
to suggest that if this hypothesis is true, it will be hard to sustain business interest 
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and investment in CSR over the long term. The relationship between altruism 
and corporate self-interest is complex and, perhaps, one of the most difficult 
areas for managers to see any demonstrable business return from their CSR 
investment (Wood and Jones, 1995).  However, we will seek evidence to support 
or refute this proposition. 
 
The Research Protocol 
The sample frame consists of the top 150 companies on the FTSE4GooD Global 
Index System1 [a division of FTSE International Ltd., FTSE (2004)] which are 
considered to provide the most comprehensive CSR reporting of all the national 
and international companies listed on the London stock exchange (see Appendix 
1 for the list). Although McCutcheon and Meredith (1993) argue that company 
reports tend to lack rigour and objectivity, Remenyi et al. (2000) argue that all 
research tactics may include biases, including experiments and surveys.  While 
acknowledging the limitations of our purposeful sample (Eisenhardt 1989), we 
suggest that this data set can still offer insights on how the most committed 
companies in Europe perform against our research hypotheses.   
 
The research instrument used is a self-administered questionnaire in which each 
of the six hypotheses is calibrated on a 5-point scale according to criteria 
identifiable from the literature and our exploratory research (see appendix 2 for 
the questionnaire).  The questionnaire was pre-tested twice by three independent 
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experts to ensure two things.  First, to check that the wording and general layout 
was clear and, second, to test that the interrogation of the firm’s online CSR 
report (a section of their annual report for 2003) led to the same categorisation of 
each of the six hypotheses, firm by firm.  Initially, a convergence of 60% was 
achieved on this categorisation, then 75% with the rewording of three of the 
hypotheses and, finally, a convergence of >90% was achieved across the ten 
sample firms drawn randomly from the list and tested independently by the 
experts and ourselves.  The survey was then carried over a two week period 
using the latest available, online company report (usually for the financial year 
ending 2003) and, not unexpectedly, 100% of the sample mentioned their CSR 
activities in varying degrees so they have all been included in our analysis. 
An initial analysis of all 150 companies failed to provide meaningful insights into 
the CSR practices of these companies, so we divide the companies into three 
groups of fifty according to market capitalisationii (Large, Medium and Small) 
which provides the basis for reporting in this paper and is in accord with 
Waddock and Graves’ (1997) research which concludes that company size does 
impact on CSR practices.  This level of disaggregation provides far greater 
insight into CSR practices.  We also explore performance by industry sectoriii to 
amplify our results and to provide illustrative examples (each company is 
categorised into one of ten industry sectors, such as extraction companies and 
banking, as appendix 1 shows). The authors acknowledge that many of the 
industry sector cell sizes are small and discuss this further in our limitations 
section later. 
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Aggregate data analysis was carried out using SPSS and one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was used to test for significant differences across the three 
groupings by market capitalisation (Large: £10.8bn - £3.82bn; Medium: £3.81bn - 
£1.28bn; Small: £1.27bn - £0.52bn).  A Levenve test confirmed that there was no 
reason to reject the assumption of homogeneity of variance (p<0.308).  Post hoc 
testing, using the Least Significant Difference (LSD) Method, was then applied to 
test significances between specific groups.  We also carried out similar post hoc 
tests to the data set by industry sector to highlight differences in certain markets. 
The significance level was set at 95% and all tests were two-tailed.   Both sets of 
results are displayed below against each of the six hypotheses in the results and 
conclusion section. 
 
Results and Conclusions 
The results of our analysis are set out so that each of the four stakeholder 
proposition is briefly discussed before drawing together the main conclusions 
about stakeholder relationships.  This is then followed by a discussion of the 
reporting of social and business outcomes linked to CSR programmes. 
 
CSR Stakeholder Relationships 
H1: Companies clearly identify key stakeholders: 
Table 1.1 
Table 1.2 
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Although we identify ten key stakeholders in our framework and from the 
literature, the sample mean of 3.29 suggests that these companies identify 
between three and seven stakeholders in their CSR reporting [a score of one 
means that a company has not identified any stakeholders whilst five means that 
it has identified all types of stakeholders as defined by Clarkson (1995).  The full 
details of all the scales are explained in Appendix 2].  ‘Large’ companies identify 
the greatest number of stakeholders while ‘Small’ firms report on less than three.  
An example of such a company is iSoft, an IT company, which only identifies two 
stakeholders. Not surprising, oil and gas exploration companies (table 1.2: 
industry sector 00) perform significantly better than all other sector when it comes 
to identifying relevant stakeholders.   For example, BP identifies eight 
stakeholders in their annual CSR report. Arguably, this is because there is great 
pressure on such companies to meet stakeholder expectations in order to 
maintain their license to operate.  With the exception of extraction companies 
(industry sector 00) and telecoms (60), the remaining FTSE4GooD companies 
identify only a narrow range of stakeholders and H1 is refuted.   
 
H2: Companies do not systematically prioritise stakeholders: 
Table 2.1 
Table 2.2 
With the exception of a few large pharmaceutical companies, such as 
GlaxoSmithKleine (no. 4 by size), and the extraction companies, none of our 
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sample seems to systematically prioritise their stakeholders (a low score means 
that companies do not set priorities between stakeholders and hence a low score 
supports H2). 
Although all recognise and mention customers as a primary group, even among 
the narrow range of stakeholders they do identify, evidence of the firm’s priority 
stakeholders is not provided by their reports.  This was the conclusion we also 
drew from our previous study and H2 is accepted.   
 
H3: CSR investment can be communicated effectively to stakeholders: 
Table 3.1 
Table 3.2 
It is interesting that most firms generally refer to one of their CSR investments 
and give some details of their purpose and commitments, albeit usually in a 
descriptive way.  Again, ‘Large’ companies are significantly more adept at 
communicating their investments than the smaller third of companies (a low 
score means that companies are not communicating effectively and a high score 
demonstrates that a company regular communicates with a large range of 
stakeholders).  For instance, within the financial sector (8), Barclays Bank (no. 8 
by size) highlights the amounts and areas where CSR investments have 
occurred while Great Portland Estates, no. 146 by size and in the same industry 
sector, makes no mention. Again, extraction companies (00), and telecoms (60) 
are more effective at communicating their investment activities than any of the 
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other companies by sector (see table 3.2).  
 
While recognising the delicate balance of what is said and how it is said without 
being seen to be exploiting CSR purely for publicity purposes, nonetheless, these 
public companies are spending shareholder money and are accountable for their 
discretionary CSR investments.  H3 is refuted.     
 
H4: Companies are not currently developing relationships with a large range of 
stakeholders: 
Table 4.1 
Table 4.2 
The data suggests that the majority of companies find it difficult to build 
relationships with more than one or two stakeholders as the mean score is 2.37 
(a company scores one when it does not describe a relationship with any 
stakeholders and five where it provides detailed evidence of relationships with 
numerous stakeholders).  
Both ‘Small’ and ‘Medium’ seem to focus on only one – usually customers – 
which seems extraordinary to us, given the claimed benefits of working with a 
broad range of stakeholders through CSR activities discussed in an earlier 
section.  Again, ‘Large’ companies and extraction companies in particular, 
perform significantly better than all other others in the sample (see table 4.2).  In 
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fact, all the extraction companies claim a broad range of relationships with 
stakeholders and are actively communicating how they are investing in these 
relationships. The response to H4 is consistent with the low level of CSR 
communications to stakeholders (H3) and how they prioritise them (H2), so H4 is 
accepted.  
 
To conclude this section on stakeholder relationships, there is a consistency in 
our findings across all four hypotheses. With the exception of extraction 
companies and telecoms, leading FTSE companies selected for their capabilities 
in CSR reporting seem neither to publicly identify their key stakeholders nor to 
prioritise them.  Most seem satisfied to acknowledge the primacy of their 
customers in their reporting.  Indeed, our data also suggests that most seem 
reluctant to build stakeholder relationships through their CSR programmes, other 
than the extraction companies who do seem to communicate their stakeholder 
relationships effectively. 
 
All the evidence drawn from our analysis of these one hundred and fifty CSR 
reports suggests that it is really only the twenty or so companies involved in 
extraction, telecoms, and to a more limited extent the utilities, which recognise 
the need to manage stakeholder relationships through their CSR programmes 
and to communicate their activities effectively.  However, for the remaining one 
hundred and thirty companies, other than the largest pharmaceutical companies 
where global expectations of their CSR activities are also sensitive, stakeholder 
 23
management seems not to have developed or should be considered embryonic 
at best.    
CSR Social and Business Outcomes 
H5: Social outcomes linked to CSR investment are difficult to identify: 
Table 5.1 
Table 5.2 
 
The reporting of social outcomes seems clearly linked to the size of the 
company, with both ‘Large’ and ‘Medium’ showing significantly differences in 
reporting to ‘Small’ companies who, generally, report on one CSR activity with a 
social outcome with a mean score of 2.52 (a company scores one when there is 
no reported link of CSR to social outcomes and five where there is strong 
reported evidence of such a link such as reported data and or case studies).  The 
larger companies, presumably because they have more dedicated resources, 
engage and report on several such CSR projects.  Again, the extraction 
companies stand alone in demonstrating their capabilities in connecting the 
social outcomes of their main CSR work against financial inputs and often use 
case studies to communicate the scope of these projects. They do, of course, 
report extensively on their emissions and pollution reduction achievements in 
response to environmental legislation and, perhaps, because it is more readily 
measured than other community programmes.  Contrary to our expectations from 
the exploratory study and the literature, H5 is rejected. 
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H6: CSR is not currently linked with specific business outcomes: 
Table 6.1 
Table 6.2 
Again, there is an evident size effect across the sample, with some ‘Large’ 
companies identifying their CSR investments with several business outcomes, 
such as share price, profit, and customer acquisition, with a mean score of 3.26 
(see table 6.1).  In contrast, most ‘Medium’ and ‘Small’ companies tend not to link 
their programmes with business goals in their formal reporting.  Of the six 
hypotheses tested, H6 scores lowest on the 5-point scale with a mean of 2.36 
and is rejected. 
To draw together our main findings on CSR reporting for these leading 
companies in the FTSE, it would appear that ‘Large’ firms focus on developing 
their CSR activities and capabilities that link outcomes with inputs through the 
mechanisms illustrated in figure 1. However, the scores across the six 
hypotheses are not high and are much lower for ‘Medium’ and ‘Small’ firms. This 
study supports the authors’ earlier conclusion from their previous exploratory 
research: 
 Most companies are not systematic and rigorous in moving through figure 1 from 
left to right.  In particular, ‘Medium’ and ‘Small’ firms in the FTSE do not: 
 (H1) identify large numbers of stakeholders (they focus on customers almost 
exclusively); nor 
 (H2) set priorities between them; neither do they 
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 (H3) communicate the impact of their CSR investments; nor 
 (H4) develop strong relationships across a range of CSR stakeholders.  
Hence, it is understandable that only a few FTSE firms can identify the impact of 
CSR upon business performance (H6), despite some evidence of measured 
social outcomes (H5). 
 
It could be that some of these stakeholder relationships are being forged 
elsewhere in the business for more commercial reasons; however, for companies 
to simply focus on customers as their key stakeholder of CSR and to allow key 
stakeholder relationships to develop solely as a by-product of commercial 
considerations, seems to us a limited ambition. Recent research by Holt, Quelch 
and Taylor (2004) on global brands and their consumer appeal, does indicate 
that over fifty percent of respondents in twelve countries express the view that 
such companies must behave responsibly on such issues as consumer health, 
the environment and worker’s rights. So from a purely marketing perspective, 
effective CSR reporting to customers is an important first step.  However, 
employee engagement seems to us a critical further step in achieving 
commitment to programmes that have a broader company and stakeholder 
appeal.  Our analysis of CSR indicates it’s rare to find a FTSE company that is 
mobilising its employees to this end.  
     
Implications for Theory 
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One conclusion drawn from our research is that firms tend to focus on the “ends” 
of Figure 1, that is, they develop a clear vision for their CSR programmes and, to 
a lesser extent, they attempt to assess the business and social outcomes 
associated with these investments. However, they fail to develop a coherent 
approach for understanding how those investments impact reputation and 
employees and, subsequently, stakeholders in creating these outcomes. There is 
also strong evidence that the largest companies, particularly those in the 
extraction and telecoms industries, are more sophisticated in their approach to 
CSR than other firms and have developed more of that understanding of how 
CSR works through stakeholders to produce outcomes.  
 
Theory provides a number of possible mechanisms by which CSR can impact 
business outcomes. Jones (1995) offers Agency Theory and Transaction Cost to 
explain that responsible firms will be more trusted (reputation in Figure 1) and 
hence will have lower transaction costs. Frooman (1999) outlines Resource 
Dependency arguments to illustrate how irresponsible firms might find critical 
resources denied to them and Mitchell et al (1997) suggest how companies can 
manage competing stakeholder demands in the context of Resource 
Dependency.  Maignan and Ferrell (2001) argue that CSR can be an element of 
the marketing strategy that enhances revenue.  
 
Our research suggests that most companies do not seem to have a “local theory” 
for linking their CSR inputs to business outcomes because they do not actively 
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manage a sufficiently large number of stakeholders or set priorities between 
them.  Only the largest firms communicate their CSR policies effectively.  It is 
difficult, therefore, for researchers to ascribe any of the above theories against 
current practices.  Clarkson (1995) infers that companies attempt to manage 
stakeholders rather than society in general but that they don’t manage these 
relationships with any degree of sophistication. The very largest companies, 
particularly extraction companies, seem to be the exception and one can only 
speculate that is either because they are at the vanguard of CSR management 
practice or that they face immediate and business-critical consequences from 
increasing stakeholder activism.  
     
Managerial Implications 
Managers need to be more thorough and systematic in their CSR practices. 
While the largest of the CSR-aware firms in this study try to link CSR with 
business and social outcomes, only the most sophisticated CSR practitioners 
manage to do so. These firms are amongst the largest FTSE4GooD companies 
and are concentrated in industries that are subject to intense social scrutiny, 
such as extraction and telecommunications.  For these firms, figure 1 is a 
reasonable illustration of their CSR practices. 
 
We can speculate whether or not the best CSR practices will spread wider than 
this select group. One could argue that the results suggest that CSR is practiced 
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systematically and rigorously either by companies facing big social pressure and 
or who are big enough to be able to ‘afford’ it. Alternately, one could speculate 
that CSR practices and measurement will develop first with these firms then 
diffuse much more widely as society demands greater transparency and 
responsibility from companies.  
 
Firms need to identify a limited set of stakeholders with whom they can develop 
strong relationships. Priorities need to be established between these 
stakeholders for firms to be able to engage with them and to manage the trade-
offs between them in the event of conflicting demands; it is unreasonable to 
expect companies to engage with vague notions of society – they need to 
engage with specific interest groups (Clarkson 1995).  Following this approach to 
improved stakeholder management, companies then need to communicate 
salient information to relevant stakeholders, particularly employees, so CSR 
investments can influence their attitudes and behaviours. As this process 
becomes better managed and more transparent, it will be easier for firms to 
understand and measure the impact of CSR upon business outcomes. 
 
Since governments are concerned that the benefits of CSR practice are shared 
with small- and medium-sized enterprises, the results of this study should 
concern policy makers. Currently, good practice is enjoyed by a very select group 
– the largest firms of FTSE companies who are most socially aware. If size 
discriminates between sophisticated and embryonic CSR practice, then one 
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might conclude that the CSR practices of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
which represent the vast majority of firms, are likely to be weak.  
 
Limitations and Further Research  
In our exploratory study (Maklan and Knox 2003), each of the CSR leaders were 
asked about how we could extend our work through a quantitative study, which 
centred on the CSR framework they had helped us develop.  When a mail or e-
mail survey across a broader sample of their peers was suggested, there was a 
negative response and two main reasons were given.   First, they are currently 
bombarded with questionnaires from NGOs demanding specific information 
about their company’s CSR policies and practices.  Consequently, they felt that 
the response levels to our questionnaire would be very low indeed, given that 
most CSR leaders of multinational companies are in the same position.  Second, 
they also considered it unlikely that many, if any, CSR spokespeople would 
reveal information about their company’s CSR programme which wasn’t in the 
public domain.  So to develop our exploratory study beyond semi-structured 
interviews, we rejected a mail survey approach in favour of interrogating the 
published reports of leading FTSE companies who meet globally recognized 
CSR standards.  The FTSE4GooD index was recognised by all our respondents 
as the most thoroughly researched index of choice.  Notwithstanding our earlier 
reflections on the likelihood of bias in company reports (McCutcheon and 
Meredith 1993), given the paucity of information available in the public domain 
and the resistance we were likely to encounter from the companies themselves, 
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we felt that a quantitative analysis of their CSR reports could be justified.   
A second limitation we recognise is the broad categorisation of some of the 
scales in the questionnaire we designed. In developing and piloting the 
questionnaire, we had to balance two things.  On the one hand, we had to ensure 
that the scales were inclusive while on the other hand, we were also seeking to 
achieve distributions around the mean that would enable us to carry out post hoc 
testing on the data set. Our results suggest that we have been able to achieve 
this balance since there seems to be a degree of consistency in the ANOVA 
results across the sample.  However, we offer our questionnaire (appendix 2) for 
other researchers to develop and modify should they wish to extend our study.    
Finally, the sub-cells for many industry sectors are very small, certainly well 
below 30 that is a widely accepted mark for making statistically significant 
comparisons between sub-cells.  This is unavoidable as there is a limited number 
of FTSE listed firms in many industry sectors, let alone the FTSE4GooD series 
and there are only a few major extraction companies, banks and telecom service 
providers.  
In future research, one might consider extending the sample frame internationally 
to overcome this limitation.  For instance, it would be interesting to do a 
comparative analysis between the UK index and the US FTSE4GooD companies 
by size and by industry sectors.  However, given that responsibility-driven 
indexes, such as the FTSE4GooD, are currently nationally based (a reflection of 
the national nature of most stock markets), any such extension would be 
challenging to normalise.  To develop descriptive CSR theory further, it seems to 
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us that researching and writing new case studies, drawn from among the best-
performing FTSE4GooD companies reported here, would build upon Clarkson’s 
(1995) work and help foster better managerial practices as the demand for 
transparency in social and environmental reporting becomes more pressing. 
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Endnotes 
i Based upon the FTSE4Good Index Series, 
http://www.ftse.com/ftse4good/criteria_methodology.jsp 
The FTSE4Good Index Series has been designed to measure the performance of companies 
that meet globally recognised corporate responsibility standards, and to facilitate investment in 
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those companies. Transparent management and criteria alongside the FTSE brand make 
FTSE4Good the index of choice for the creation of Socially Responsible Investment products.  
 
ii Raw data and detailed LSD analysis by company market capitalisation and industry sector can 
be obtained from: French, P. (2004).  How, What and Why do Companies Communicate CSR to 
their Stakeholders? Unpublished MSc Thesis, Cranfield School of Management, Bedford, MK43 
0AL, UK. 
 
iii The Industry Sectors consist of: 
00=Resources, e.g. mining, oil and gas; 1=Basic industries, e.g. chemicals, construction and 
building materials; 2=General industries, eg. aerospace and defense, engineering and machinery; 
3=Cyclical consumer goods, e.g. automobiles and parts, household goods and textiles; 4=Non-
cyclical consumer goods, eg. pharmaceutical, tobacco and beverage companies; 5=Cyclical 
services, eg. general retailers, leisure and hotels; 6=Non-cyclical services, e.g.. food and drug 
retailers, telecoms; 7=Utilities, e.g.. electricity, gas; 8=Financials, e.g.. banks, insurance; 
9=Information Technology, e.g.. hardware, software and computer services.  
 
Appendix 1: The sample frame of 150 FTSE4GooD companies by market 
capitalisation and industry sectors: 
 
 
Company 
 
Market 
Capitalisation
(July 2004) 
Industry 
Sectoriii 
 
BP                                   108150.1 00
HSBC Hldgs                           86241.31 80
Vodafone Group                       78734.3 60
GlaxoSmithKline                      62114.32 40
Royal Bank Of Scotland Group         47543.52 80
Shell Transport & Trading Co         38786.7 00
AstraZeneca                          38436.37 40
Barclays                             28667.01 80
HBOS                                 26243.85 80
Lloyds TSB Group                     21797.89 80
Diageo                               21273.98 40
Tesco                                19750.36 60
BT Group                             16408.04 60
Unilever                             14773.33 40
National Grid Transco                13470.67 70
BHP Billiton                         12185.7 00
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BG Group                             12109.78 00
Aviva                                11908.46 80
Reckitt Benckiser                    10526.25 40
Centrica                             10460.72 70
Standard Chartered                   10159.79 80
Cadbury Schweppes                    9669.422 40
British Sky Broadcasting Group       8824.004 50
Prudential                           8768.703 80
GUS                                  8259.26 50
Marks & Spencer Group                7844.902 50
mmO2                                 7607.955 60
Compass Group                        7236.5 50
Scottish Power                       7216.44 70
SABMiller                            7190.768 40
Abbey National                       7080.11 80
Kingfisher                           6527.358 50
Reed Elsevier                        6128.167 50
WPP Group                            6080.778 50
Scottish & Southern Energy           6043.36 70
Legal & General Group                6030.083 80
BAA                                  5904.011 50
Land Securities Group                5441.045 80
Carnival                             5410.875 50
Smith & Nephew                       5124.364 40
Boots Group                          5048.766 50
Allied Domecq                        5045.961 40
Pearson                              5014.8 50
Reuters Group                        4655.28 50
BOC Group                            4530.706 10
ITV                                  4313.166 50
Man Group                            4296.353 80
InterContinental Hotels Group        4150.439 50
Hilton Group                         3970.962 50
Old Mutual                           3822.479 80
Next                                 3813.94 50
Scottish & Newcastle                 3685.353 40
Alliance & Leicester                 3651.233 80
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British Land Co                      3598.467 80
Sainsbury (J)                        3254.639 60
Dixons Group                         3047.299 50
Northern Rock                        2918.916 80
United Utilities                     2885.254 70
Severn Trent                         2795.696 70
Cable & Wireless                     2763.265 60
Amvescap                             2596.334 80
British Airways                      2569.75 50
Imperial Chemical Industries         2495.774 10
Whitbread                            2482.635 50
Friends Provident                    2474.884 80
Rexam                                2350.362 50
Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance 
Group 2233.92 80
Exel                                 2191.86 50
Sage Group                           2179.235 90
Shire Pharmaceuticals Group          2092.05 40
Capita Group                         2043.351 50
Bunzl                                2000.242 50
Tomkins                              1977.415 20
Hammerson                            1972.871 80
Johnson Matthey                      1956.212 10
Kelda Group                          1937.346 70
Slough Estates                       1900.192 80
Emap                                 1889.929 50
Corus Group                          1851.512 10
Signet Group                         1825.405 50
Alliance UniChem                     1792.131 40
Trinity Mirror                       1781.535 50
EMI Group                            1725.72 50
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nav 
Co   1681.802 50
Bradford & Bingley                   1612.828 80
International Power                  1583.348 70
RMC Group                            1550.556 10
Brambles Industries                  1541.47 50
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United Business Media                1531.599 50
Travis Perkins                       1528.928 10
Kesa Electricals                     1503.931 50
Tate & Lyle                          1501.7 40
Provident Financial                  1461.797 80
Electrocomponents                    1460.41 50
Berkeley Group                       1429.908 10
Mitchells & Butlers                  1382.483 50
Lonmin                               1351.837 00
HHG plc                              1334.778 80
Associated British Ports Hldgs       1296.653 50
IMI                                  1275.582 20
Inchcape                             1270.627 40
LogicaCMG                            1239.07 90
BBA Group                            1209.714 50
Stagecoach Group                     1206.556 50
FirstGroup                           1144.451 50
Johnston Press                       1138.501 50
London Stock Exchange                1137.51 80
Aggregate Industries                 1078.959 10
ARM Holdings                         1063.91 90
United Utilities A Shs               1033.867 70
Cattles                              1006.496 80
Kidde                                998.0387 20
Invensys                             980.8976 20
Misys                                969.9186 90
Close Brothers Group                 951.115 80
Pennon Group                         941.7664 70
Aegis Group                          939.8086 50
Schroders                            930.555 80
National Express Group               923.8673 50
Taylor Nelson Sofres                 923.6955 50
AWG                                  886.054 70
RAC                                  844.5272 50
Arriva                               820.5395 50
MFI Furniture Group                  819.5511 50
Brixton                              799.6721 80
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Viridian Group                       795.9796 70
Smith (WH) Group                     792.212 50
Premier Farnell                      764.1897 50
Davis Service Group                  755.8082 50
FKI                                  687.7874 20
iSOFT Group                          686.2114 90
Britannic Group                      676.598 80
Wolverhampton & Dudley               674.5972 50
Manchester United                    654.696 50
Woolworths Group                     635.3898 50
Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group        625.7489 80
Bovis Homes Group                    616.9159 10
Amlin                                598.4979 80
Michael Page International           594.9468 50
De La Rue                            586.7951 50
Burberry Group                       585 50
Go-Ahead Group                       570.65 50
Countrywide                          566.5799 80
Quintain Estates and Development    565.3252 80
Halma                                561.2833 20
Great Portland Estates               548.2134 80
Spectris                             537.8006 20
Mersey Docks & Harbour Co            533.3328 50
SSL International                    525.5295 40
Wetherspoon(J D)                     518.9843 50
 
 41
Appendix 2: The Questionnaire used to interrogate the 150 FTSE4GooD 
Companies  
 
H1. Companies clearly identify stakeholders  
 
Criteria  
 
1 = Stakeholders are not identified  
2 = One stakeholder is identified  
3 = Up to 3 key stakeholders are identified  
4 = Up to 7 stakeholders are identified 
5 = All 8 key stakeholders (as defined by Clarkson, 1995) are clearly identified 
 
H2. Companies do not systematically prioritise stakeholders 
 
Criteria  
 
1 = Stakeholders are not prioritised  
2 = One Stakeholder is given greater priority 
3 = Up to 3 key stakeholders are prioritised  
4 = Up to 7 stakeholders (as defined by Clarkson, 1995) are prioritised 
5 = All 8 main stakeholders (as defined by Clarkson, 1995) are systematically 
prioritised by importance to the organisation’s objectives 
 
H3. CSR investment are communicated effectively to stakeholders  
 
Criteria 
 
1 = Investment in CSR is not communicated 
2 = One example of CSR investment is communicated 
3 = More than one example of CSR investment is communicated  
4 = CSR investment is communicated more than once and linked to a 
stakeholder in one example with financial figures 
5 = CSR investment is communicated more than once and linked to a 
stakeholder on more than one occasion with financial figures 
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H4. Companies are not currently developing relationships with a large 
range of stakeholders 
 
Criteria 
 
1 = Relationships with stakeholders are not identified  
2 = One relationship with a stakeholder is identified 
3 = More than one relationship with a stakeholder is identified 
4 = A range of relationships with different stakeholders are identified and initial 
investment in them has started (Eg. An organisation has set-up specific 
panels or campaigns to engage with a range of individual stakeholder 
groups)   
5 = Relationships with a large range of stakeholders and how the organisation 
has reacted to them are clearly identified in case study form. (Eg. There 
are case studies highlighting how these relationships have been formed 
and developed over a number of years as well as evidence that the 
company has demonstrated a willingness to change its policies after 
consultation) 
 
H5.  Social outcomes from CSR investment are difficult to identify 
 
Criteria 
 
1 = No outcomes from CSR investment are identified 
2 = One social outcome from CSR investment is identified 
3 = More than one outcome from CSR investment is identified 
4 = Social outcomes from CSR investment are identified and one is linked 
to a specific example that highlights the financial investment 
5 = Social outcomes from CSR investment are identified and more than 
one is linked to a specific example that highlights the financial 
investment. A case study is also used to highlight the social outcomes 
from CSR investment. 
 
 
H6. CSR investment is not linked with specific business outcomes 
 
Criteria 
 
1 = Linking CSR investment to specific business outcomes is not identified 
2 = CSR investment is identified and linked with one business outcome  
3 = CSR investment is identified and linked with several business 
outcomes. (Eg. Share price, profit, customer acquisition etc)  
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4 = Business outcomes from CSR investment are identified and one is 
linked to a specific example in case study form. This example 
highlights the link between financial investment and business 
implications 
5 = Business outcomes from CSR investment are identified and more than 
one is linked to a specific examples that highlight the financial 
investment. Case studies are also used to highlight the business 
outcomes from CSR investment. 
 
 
 
 Table 1.1 Analysis by Company Size 
 
 
 
Size N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean Minimum Maximum 
          Lower Bound Upper Bound     
Large 50 3.64 1.306 .185 3.27 4.01 1 5
Med 50 3.32 1.115 .158 3.00 3.64 1 5
Small 50 2.90 1.313 .186 2.53 3.27 1 5
Total 150 3.29 1.276 .104 3.08 3.49 1 5
- Indicates significance at the 95% level or greater 
 
Table 1.2  Analysis by Industry Sector1 
 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Ind. 
Sect.  N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum 
Maxi-
mum 
00 5 5.00 .000 .000 5.00 5.00 5 5
10 9 2.56 1.333 .444 1.53 3.58 1 4
20 7 3.29 .951 .360 2.41 4.17 2 5
40 15 3.20 1.207 .312 2.53 3.87 1 5
50 56 3.05 1.212 .162 2.73 3.38 1 5
60 6 4.33 .516 .211 3.79 4.88 4 5
70 12 3.83 1.337 .386 2.98 4.68 1 5
80 35 3.31 1.345 .227 2.85 3.78 1 5
90 5 3.00 1.225 .548 1.48 4.52 1 4
Total 150 3.29 1.276 .104 3.08 3.49 1 5
Relationship with Industry sector is significant at the 95% level unless marked with * 
 
                                                 
1 The Industry Sectors consist of: 
00=Resources, e.g. mining, oil and gas; 1=Basic industries, e.g. chemicals, construction and building materials; 
2=General industries, eg. aerospace and defense, engineering and machinery; 3=Cyclical consumer goods, e.g. 
automobiles and parts, household goods and textiles; 4=Non-cyclical consumer goods, eg. pharmaceutical, tobacco 
and beverage companies; 5=Cyclical services, eg. general retailers, leisure and hotels; 6=Non-cyclical services, e.g.. 
food and drug retailers, telecoms; 7=Utilities, e.g.. electricity, gas; 8=Financials, e.g.. banks, insurance; 9=Information 
Technology, e.g.. hardware, software and computer services.  
  
Table 2.1 Analysis by Company Size 
 
 
 
Size N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean Minimum Maximum 
          Lower Bound Upper Bound     
Large 50 2.96 1.370 .194 2.57 3.35 1 5
Med 50 2.32 1.019 .144 2.03 2.61 1 5
Small 50 2.22 .932 .132 1.96 2.48 1 5
Total 150 2.50 1.163 .095 2.31 2.69 1 5
- Indicates significance at the 95% level or greater 
 
Table 2.2 Analysis by Industry Sector 
 
 
 
Ind. 
Sect. N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean Minimum Maximum 
          Lower Bound Upper Bound     
00 5 4.60 .548 .245 3.92 5.28 4 5
10 9 2.11 .601 .200 1.65 2.57 1 3
20 7 2.86 1.215 .459 1.73 3.98* 2 5
40 15 2.73 1.163 .300 2.09 3.38 1 5
50 56 2.16 .987 .132 1.90 2.42 1 5
60 6 3.67 1.033 .422 2.58 4.75* 3 5
70 12 2.92 .900 .260 2.34 3.49 1 4
80 35 2.43 1.267 .214 1.99 2.86 1 5
90 5 1.80 .837 .374 .76 2.84 1 3
Total 150 2.50 1.163 .095 2.31 2.69 1 5
Relationship with Industry sector is significant at the 95% level unless marked with * 
 
Table 3.1 Analysis by Company Size 
 
 
 
Size N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean Minimum Maximum 
          Lower Bound Upper Bound     
Large 50 3.66 1.334 .189 3.28 4.04 1 5
Med 50 3.12 1.154 .163 2.79 3.45 1 5
Small 50 2.62 1.369 .194 2.23 3.01 1 5
Total 150 3.13 1.349 .110 2.92 3.35 1 5
- Indicates significance at the 95% level or greater 
 
Table 3.2 Analysis by Industry Sector 
 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Ind. 
Sect. N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum
00 5 4.80 .447 .200 4.24 5.36 4 5
10 9 3.11 1.054 .351 2.30 3.92 1 4
20 7 3.43 .787 .297 2.70 4.16 2 4
40 15 3.27 1.486 .384 2.44 4.09 1 5
50 56 2.84 1.372 .183 2.47 3.21 1 5
60 6 4.00 .894 .365 3.06 4.94* 3 5
70 12 3.58 1.240 .358 2.80 4.37* 1 5
80 35 3.06 1.434 .242 2.56 3.55 1 5
90 5 2.40 .894 .400 1.29 3.51 1 3
Total 150 3.13 1.349 .110 2.92 3.35 1 5
Relationship with Industry sector is significant at the 95% level unless marked with * 
Table 4.1 Analysis by Company Size 
 
 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum
Large 50 3.14 1.355 .192 2.75 3.53 1 5
Med 50 2.12 1.023 .145 1.83 2.41 1 4
Small 50 1.84 .955 .135 1.57 2.11 1 4
Total 150 2.37 1.250 .102 2.16 2.57 1 5
- Indicates significance at the 95% level or greater 
 
Table 4.2  Analysis by Industry Sector 
 
 
 
Ind. 
Sect. N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean Minimum Maximum 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound     
00 5 4.20 1.095 .490 2.84 5.56 3 5
10 9 2.44 1.236 .412 1.49 3.39* 1 4
20 7 2.43 .976 .369 1.53 3.33* 1 4
40 15 2.93 1.438 .371 2.14 3.73* 1 5
50 56 1.93 .988 .132 1.66 2.19 1 5
60 6 3.17 .983 .401 2.13 4.20* 2 4
70 12 2.83 1.030 .297 2.18 3.49* 1 4
80 35 2.31 1.388 .235 1.84 2.79 1 5
90 5 1.80 1.095 .490 .44 3.16* 1 3
Total 150 2.37 1.250 .102 2.16 2.57 1 5
Relationship with Industry sector is significant at the 95% level unless marked with * 
 
Table 5.1 Analysis by Company Size 
 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Size N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum
Large 50 3.50 1.418 .201 3.10 3.90 1 5
Med 50 3.40 1.125 .159 3.08 3.72 1 5
Small 50 2.52 1.297 .183 2.15 2.89 1 5
Total 150 3.14 1.351 .110 2.92 3.36 1 5
- Indicates significance at the 95% level or greater 
 
Table 5.2 Analysis by Industry Sector 
 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Ind. 
Sect. N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum
00 5 4.80 .447 .200 4.24 5.36 4 5
10 9 3.56 1.509 .503 2.40 4.72* 1 5
20 7 3.29 1.254 .474 2.13 4.45* 1 5
40 15 3.27 1.534 .396 2.42 4.12 1 5
50 56 2.84 1.276 .171 2.50 3.18 1 5
60 6 3.50 1.643 .671 1.78 5.22* 1 5
70 12 3.33 1.155 .333 2.60 4.07 1 5
80 35 3.20 1.368 .231 2.73 3.67 1 5
90 5 2.20 .837 .374 1.16 3.24 1 3
Total 150 3.14 1.351 .110 2.92 3.36 1 5
Relationship with Industry sector is significant at the 95% level unless marked with * 
 
Table 6.1 Analysis by Company Size 
 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum
Large 50 3.26 1.496 .212 2.83 3.69 1 5
Med 50 2.10 .953 .135 1.83 2.37 1 4
Small 50 1.72 .784 .111 1.50 1.94 1 3
Total 150 2.36 1.292 .105 2.15 2.57 1 5
- Indicates significance at the 95% level or greater 
 
Table 6.2 Analysis by Industry Sector 
 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Ind. 
Sect. N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum
00 5 4.80 .447 .200 4.24 5.36 4 5
10 9 2.00 1.000 .333 1.23 2.77 1 3
20 7 2.14 .900 .340 1.31 2.97 1 3
40 15 2.60 1.454 .375 1.79 3.41 1 5
50 56 1.88 .854 .114 1.65 2.10 1 4
60 6 3.83 1.329 .543 2.44 5.23* 2 5
70 12 2.83 .835 .241 2.30 3.36 1 4
80 35 2.57 1.520 .257 2.05 3.09 1 5
90 5 1.20 .447 .200 .64 1.76 1 2
Total 150 2.36 1.292 .105 2.15 2.57 1 5
Relationship with Industry Sector is significant at the 95% level unless marked with * 
 
